2023-10-04 Wed
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D. & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. Psychological Science, 22(11), 1359–1366. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611417632
Evidence says | True fact | False fact |
---|---|---|
True | True positive | False positive (Type I) |
False | False negative (Type II) | True negative |
Note
\(\alpha\), \(\beta\), \(\gamma\), \(\delta\)…
are letters from the Greek alphabet.
Evidence says | True fact | False fact |
---|---|---|
True | \(1-\beta\) | \(\alpha\) |
False | \(\beta\) | \(1-\alpha\) |
Note
Why might a researcher do these things?
Why might such choices be questionable?
The culprit is a construct we refer to as researcher degrees of freedom. In the course of collecting and analyzing data, researchers have many decisions to make: Should more data be collected? Should some observations be excluded? Which conditions should be combined and which ones compared? Which control variables should be considered? Should specific measures be combined or transformed or both?
Note
What’s a degree of freedom?
What does it mean in this context?
It is rare, and sometimes impractical, for researchers to make all these decisions beforehand. Rather, it is common (and accepted practice) for researchers to explore various analytic alternatives, to search for a combination that yields “statistical significance,” and to then report only what “worked.”
Note
The problem, of course, is that the likelihood of at least one (of many) analyses producing a falsely positive finding at the 5% level is necessarily greater than 5%.
This exploratory behavior is not the by-product of malicious intent, but rather the result of two factors: (a) ambiguity in how best to make these decisions and (b) the researcher’s desire to find a statistically significant result.
Note
What did (Feynman, 1974) say about when scientists should bend over backwards and why?
Richard Feynmann
…a specific, extra type of integrity that is not lying, but bending over backwards to show how you’re maybe wrong, that you ought to do when acting as a scientist. And this is our responsibility as scientists…and I think to laymen.
Richard Feynmann
The first principle is that you must not fool yourself—and you are the easiest person to fool. So you have to be very careful about that. After you’ve not fooled yourself, it’s easy not to fool other scientists…
In a perusal of roughly 30 Psychological Science articles, we discovered considerable inconsistency in, and hence considerable ambiguity about, this decision. Most (but not all) researchers excluded some responses for being too fast, but what constituted “too fast” varied enormously: the fastest 2.5%, or faster than 2 standard deviations from the mean, or faster than 100 or 150 or 200 or 300 ms.
Similarly, what constituted “too slow” varied enormously: the slowest 2.5% or 10%, or 2 or 2.5 or 3 standard deviations slower than the mean, or 1.5 standard deviations slower from that condition’s mean, or slower than 1,000 or 1,200 or 1,500 or 2,000 or 3,000 or 5,000 ms. None of these decisions is necessarily incorrect, but that fact makes any of them justifiable and hence potential fodder for self-serving justifications.
Note
When we “trim outliers” from our data what assumption(s) are we making?
When are those assumptions justified and when might they not be?
More on QRPs
PSYCH 490.009: 2023-10-04 Wed