Scientific norms and counter-norms

Roadmap

Extra credit opportunity

  1. Read Feynman (1974) or one of (Harris, 2017), Chapter 1, Begley’s Bombshell. PDF on Canvas or Begley & Ellis (2012).
  2. In no more than one page, answer one of the questions posed in the notes from last time on Feynman or on Begley & Ellis.
  3. Submit your answer via Canvas to Garrett by Monday, January 16, 2023 at 5:00 pm.
  4. Worth 2 points.

Discuss (Merton, 1973)

[Robert K. Merton](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_K._Merton): Wikipedia

Figure 16: Robert K. Merton: Wikipedia

Difficult as the notion may appear to those reared in a culture that grants science a prominent if not a commanding place in the scheme of things, it is evident that science is not immune from attack, restraint, and repression. Writing a little while ago, Veblen could observe that the faith of western culture in science was unbounded, unquestioned, unrivaled. The revolt from science which then appeared so improbable as to concern only the timid academician who would ponder all contingencies, however remote, has now been forced upon the attention of scientist and layman alike. Local contagions of anti-intellectualism threaten to become epidemic.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 267

Science is a deceptively inclusive word which refers to a variety of distinct though interrelated items. It is commonly used to denote (1) a set of characteristic methods by means of which knowledge is certified; (2) a stock of accumulated knowledge stemming from the application of these methods; (3) a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific; or (4) any combination of the foregoing.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 268

The ethos of science

The mores of science possess a methodologic rationale but they are binding, not only because they are procedurally efficient, but because they are believed right and good.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 270

Universalism

  • See paragraph at top of p. 271 for context about the following:

Yet this very deviation from the norm of universalism actually presupposed the the legitimacy of the norm. For nationalistic bias is oppropbrious only if judged in terms of the standard of universalism; within another institutional context, it is redefined as a virtue patriotism. Thus, in the process of condemning their violation, the mores are reaffirmed.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 271

To restrict scientific careers on grounds other than lack of competence is to prejudice the furtherance of knowledge.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 272

“Communism”

  • Often called “communalism” today

“Communism” in the nontechnical and extended sense of common ownership of goods…The substantive findings of science are a product of a social collaboration and are assigned to the community…Property rights in sciences are whittled down to a bare minimum by the rationale of the scientific ethic.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 273

The institutional conception of science as part of the public domain is linked with the imperative for communication of scientific findings. Secrecy is the antithesis of this norm; full and open communication is its enactment.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 274

Disinterestedness

The virtual absence of fraud in the annals of science, which appears exceptional when compared with the record of other spheres of activity, has at times been attributed to the personal qualities of scientists…There is, in fact, no satisfactory evidence that such is the case; a more plausible explanation may be found in certain characteristcs of science itself…the activities of scientists are subject to rigorous policing, to a degree perhaps unparalleled in any other field of activity.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 276

It is probable that the reputability of science and its lofty ethical status in the estimate of the layman is in no small measure due to technological achievements…the laity is often in no position to distinguish spurious from genuine claims…The presumably scientific pronouncements of totalitarian spokensmen are for the uninstructed laity of the same order as newspaper reports on an expanding universe or wave mechanics.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 277

Organized Skepticism

…is variously interrelated with other elements of the scientific ethos. It is both a methodological and institutional mandate.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 277

The scientific investigator does not preserve the cleavage between the sacred and the profane, between that which requires uncritical respect and that which can be objectively analyzed.

– (Merton, 1973), p. 277-278

Mnemonic: C-U-D-OS

Discuss Mitroff (1974)

[Ian I. Mitroff](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ian_Mitroff): Fig source Amazon

Figure 17: Ian I. Mitroff: Fig source Amazon

…the personal character of science infuses its entire structure. The testing and validating of scientific ideas is as governed by the deep personal character of science as the initial discovery of the ideas…Polyani (1958) argues that not only is this the case, but it ought to be the case. That is, science outght to be personal to its core.

– Mitroff (1974), p. 580

…what the body of scientists thought about their fellow scientists. Who were perceived as most committed to their pet hypotheses? What did they think of such behavior? What did the scientists think of the abstract idea of commitment [to a pet hypothesis] itself…

– Mitroff (1974), p. 582

All the interviews exhibit high affective content. They document the often fierce, sometimes bitter, competitive races for discovery and the intense emotions which permeate the doing of science.

– Mitroff (1974), p. 585

The term “commitment” was used in three distinct (but related) senses. The first expresssed the notion of intellectual commitment, that is that scientific observerations were theory-laden…The second sense expressed the notion of affective commitment…The third sense expressed the notion that the entire process of science demanded deep personal commitment.

– Mitroff (1974), p. 586

Table 4: A Tentative List of Norms and Counternorms

Norms Counternorms
1. Faith in the moral virtue of rationality (Barber, 1952). 1. Faith in the moral virtue of rationality and nonrationality (cf., Tart, 1972).
2. Emotional neutrality as an instrumental condition for the achievement of rationality (Barber, 1952). 2. Emotional commitment as an instrumental condition for the achievement of rationality.
3. Universalism: “The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the list of science is not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonist; his race, nationality, religion, class and personal qualities are as such irrelevant. Objectivity precludes particularism …. The imperative of universalism is rooted deep in the impersonal character of science” (Merton, 1949:607). 3. Particularism: “The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the list of science is to a large extent a function of who makes the claim” (Boguslaw, 1968:59). The social and psychological characteristics of the scientist are important factors influencing how his work will be judged. The work of certain scientists will be given priority over that of others (Mitroff, 1974b). The imperative of particularism is rooted deep in the personal character of science (Merton, 1963a; Polanyi, 1958).
4. Communism: “Property rights are reduced to the absolute minimum of credit for priority of discovery” (Barber, 1952:130). “Secrecy is the antithesis’ of this norm; full and open communication [of scientific results] its enactment” (Merton, 1949:611). 4. Solitariness (or, “Miserism” [Boguslaw, 1968:59]): Property rights are expanded to include protective control over the disposition of one’s discoveries; secrecy thus becomes a necessary moral act (Mitroff, 1974b).
5. Disinterestedness: “Scientists are expected by their peers to achieve the self-interest they have in work–satisfaction and in prestige through serving the [scientific] community interest directly” (Barber, 1952:132). 5. Interestedness: Scientists are expected by their close colleagues to achieve the self-interest they have in work-satisfaction and in prestige through serving their special communities of interest, e.g., their invisible college (Boguslaw, 1968:59; Mitroff, 1974b)
6. Organized scepticism: “The scientist is obliged … to make public his criticisms of the work of others when he believes it to be in error … no scientist’s contribution to knowledge can be accepted without careful scrutiny, and that the scientist must doubt his own findjngs as well as those of others” (Storer, 1966: 79). 6. Organized dogmatism: “Each scientist should make certain that previous work by others on which he bases his work is sufficiently identified so that others can be held responsible for inadequacies while any possible credit accrues to oneself” (Boguslaw, 1968:59). The scientist must believe in his own findings with utter conviction while doubting those of others with all his worth (Mitroff, 1974b).

Adapted from Table 4. Mitroff (1974), p. 592.

References

Anderson, M. S., Ronning, E. A., Devries, R., & Martinson, B. C. (2010). Extending the mertonian norms: Scientists’ subscription to norms of research. The Journal of Higher Education, 81(3), 366–393. https://doi.org/10.1353/jhe.0.0095
Begley, C. G., & Ellis, L. M. (2012). Drug development: Raise standards for preclinical cancer research. Nature, 483(7391), 531–533. https://doi.org/10.1038/483531a
Feynman, R. P. (1974). Cargo cult science. Retrieved from https://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.htm
Harris, R. (2017). Rigor mortis: How sloppy science creates worthless cures, crushes hope, and wastes billions (1st edition). Basic Books.
Kardash, C. M., & Edwards, O. V. (2012). Thinking and behaving like scientists: Perceptions of undergraduate science interns and their faculty mentors. Instructional Science, 40(6), 875–899. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11251-011-9195-0
Kim, S. Y., & Kim, Y. (2018). The ethos of science and its correlates: An empirical analysis of scientists’ endorsement of mertonian norms. Science, Technology and Society, 23(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0971721817744438
Macfarlane, B., & Cheng, M. (2008). Communism, universalism and disinterestedness: Re-examining contemporary support among academics for merton’s scientific norms. Journal of Academic Ethics, 6(1), 67–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10805-008-9055-y
Merton, R. W. (1973). The normative structure of science. In R. K. Merton & N. W. Storer (Eds.), The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations (pp. 267–278). The University of Chicago Press.
Mitroff, I. I. (1974). Norms and counter-norms in a select group of the apollo moon scientists: A case study of the ambivalence of scientists. American Sociological Review, 39(4), 579–595. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094423